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The European Court of Human Rights and Domestic Violence:  
Valiuliene v Lithuania.  
 
Abstract. 
 
This article analyses the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on 
the issue of domestic violence, with a particular focus on Valiuliene v Lithuania.  It 
seems that to date the Court’s jurisprudence on this issue is somewhat inconsistent, and 
with Valiuliene v Lithuania the Court was given an opportunity to clarify its approach in 
this area.  There are certainly a number of positive aspects to the Court’s judgment, 
however there are also difficulties with the approach of the Court in this case.  Overall it 
is to be hoped that the judgment in Valiuliene v Lithuania will mark the beginning of a 
more coherent jurisprudence as regards domestic violence.          
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With the case of Valiuliene v Lithuania,1 the European Court of Human Rights 
once again added to its increasing corpus of jurisprudence on the subject of domestic 
violence.  The recent spate of cases on domestic violence which have been considered by 
the European Court is remarkable, given that it was not until 2007 that domestic violence 
was addressed substantively by the Court.  Indeed, in the last seven years the issue of 
domestic violence has been addressed at regular intervals, and violations of Articles 2, 3, 
8 and 14 have been found in various cases involving violence against women taking place 
in the home.  Whilst this consideration of domestic violence by the European Court is to 
be welcomed, it seems that the Court’s jurisprudence in this area is somewhat incoherent.  
With the case of Valiuliene v Lithuania, the Court was provided with an opportunity to 
clarify its approach to the issue of domestic violence, an opportunity of which it did not 
fully take advantage.  It should be noted that the focus of the analysis in this article is on 
the use of Articles 3 and 8 in domestic violence cases, and that the use of Article 14 in 
such cases is not examined.        
 
The facts of Valiuliene v Lithuania.      
 
In Valiuliene v Lithuania the applicant argued that the State had failed to protect 
her sufficiently from domestic violence, and that the criminal proceedings she had 
instituted against her abuser had been futile.  Between 3 January and 4 February 2001, 
the applicant had been beaten on five occasions by her partner J.H.L. with whom she had 
been living at the time.  She alleged that she had been strangled, pulled by the hair, hit in 
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the face and kicked in the back and in other parts of her body.  On each occasion, forensic 
expert examinations had concluded that the injuries sustained by the applicant were 
minor and had not caused any health problems in the short or long term.   
 
On 14 February 2001 the applicant lodged an application with the City District 
Court to bring a private prosecution against J.H.L.  In her application she alleged that the 
acts of violence against her constituted the offence of causing minor bodily harm under 
Article 116 of the Criminal Code which was then in force in Lithuania.  The applicant 
provided a list containing the names and addresses of individuals whom she wished to 
call as witnesses, and also medical reports concerning her injuries.  In addition, the 
applicant requested that the City District Court provide her with evidence from the city 
police about the violence to which she had been subjected.  In January 2002 the City 
District Court forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the city public prosecutor, ordering 
him to start his own pre-trial criminal investigation.  The reason given by the City District 
Court for the request for a public prosecution was that J.H.L. had failed to appear in court 
on a number of occasions.  J.H.L. was subsequently charged with having deliberately and 
systematically injured the applicant, resulting in her having sustained minor bodily harm.  
However, the investigation was suspended and reopened on numerous occasions due to 
J.H.L. failing to appear in court.  The applicant lodged an appeal each time the 
investigation was suspended.  On two occasions the police investigator made the decision 
to discontinue the pre-trial investigation, on the basis that there was insufficient evidence 
to prove that J.H.L. had perpetrated the crimes against the applicant.  The first of these 
decisions was quashed by the prosecutor on the ground that the pre-trial investigation had 
not been sufficiently thorough.  However, the second decision to discontinue the pre-trial 
investigation was upheld by a public prosecutor in February 2003.  The applicant 
appealed against this decision in February 2004 and the proceedings were again 
reopened.   
 
In June 2005 the prosecutor held that it had been established during the pre-trial 
investigation that the applicant had been strangled, hit and kicked on five occasions 
between January and February 2001, as a result of which she had sustained minor bodily 
harm.  The prosecutor also stated that J.H.L. was suspected of having perpetrated the acts 
in question.  However, the prosecutor nevertheless decided to discontinue the pre-trial 
investigation on the grounds that the law had changed in May 2003.  Under Article 407 
of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, criminal proceedings for offences such as 
causing minor bodily harm may only be opened upon a complaint by the victim.  If the 
victim lodges such a complaint, under Article 408 he or she becomes the private 
prosecutor.  It was therefore held that the prosecution should have been brought by the 
applicant in a private capacity.  Under Article 409 of the new Code of Criminal 
Procedure, the public prosecutor has a right to open a criminal investigation into offences 
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usually investigated by means of private prosecution, such as the offence of causing 
minor bodily harm, if the crime is of public importance or if there are important reasons 
as to why the victim is unable to protect his or her rights.  However, the prosecutor in the 
case in question held that there was no reason for a public prosecution as he did not 
consider the crime to be ‘of public importance’ for the purposes of Article 409 of the 
Code.  It was therefore up to the applicant to apply to bring a private prosecution against 
J.H.L. 
 
The applicant appealed against this decision, pointing out that she had in fact 
initiated a private prosecution four years previously, however the City District Court had 
transferred her complaint to a public prosecutor, who had initiated the pre-trial 
investigation.  This investigation had continued after May 2003, when the new Code of 
Criminal Procedure had entered into force, therefore the applicant had been led to believe 
that the charges in the case were being pursued by the public prosecutor.  The applicant 
argued that if the prosecutor had deemed that her case should be dealt with by means of a 
private prosecution, he should have informed her of this immediately after the new 
legislation had entered into force in  May 2003, instead of waiting for two years to inform 
her of his decision.  This delay was particularly problematic as the end of the limitation 
period for prosecuting J.H.L. was fast approaching.  However the applicant’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
The applicant subsequently attempted to bring a private prosecution against J.H.L.  
She lodged a complaint describing the five episodes of violence which had taken place 
between January and February 2001 and requesting that J.H.L. be prosecuted for causing 
minor bodily harm.  However her request was ultimately refused on the basis that the 
prosecution had now become time-barred. 
 
The case before the European Court of Human Rights.      
 
Following the failure of her attempts to have J.H.L. prosecuted under domestic 
law, the applicant then brought a case to the European Court of Human Rights.  Initially 
relying on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to a fair 
trial, and Article 13 of the Convention, the right to an effective remedy, she argued that 
the national authorities had failed to investigate the acts of domestic violence against her 
and to hold J.H.L. accountable.  She also alleged that the criminal proceedings had been 
excessively lengthy.  The European Court found however that the appropriate Articles to 
be relied upon in this instance were in fact Article 3, the right to be free from torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and Article 8, the right to respect for 
private and family life. 
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In response, the State asserted that the treatment to which the applicant had been 
subjected had not attained the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of 
Article 3 of the European Convention.  The State argued that as the applicant had 
sustained minor bodily harm that had not resulted in short or long term health problems, 
‘it could be said that the injuries sustained by the applicant had been of a merely trivial 
nature’.2  The State was of the view that responses to the ill-treatment other than that of 
relying on the criminal law could have been utilised by the applicant, such as 
approaching a women’s crisis centre or a family support centre.  The applicant could also 
have brought a claim for compensation against J.H.L. using civil law mechanisms.  The 
State argued therefore that any obligations as regards the complaints of the applicant fell 
to be dealt with under Article 8 only.    
   
The State did however acknowledge that the investigation of the applicant’s 
complaints had lasted too long and that this had resulted in the case ultimately becoming 
time-barred.  It also admitted that ‘it was regrettable that the case had not been fully and 
efficiently investigated and the perpetrator of the alleged crime had not been convicted.’3  
The State therefore presented the European Court with a unilateral declaration on 1 
September 2011, acknowledging a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.  Very 
interestingly however, on 5 June 2012 the Court decided not to accept this declaration.   
 
The judgment of the Court.    
 
On 26 March 2013 the European Court of Human Rights issued its decision in 
Valiuliene v Lithuania.  The first point which the Court addressed in its judgment was the 
State’s assertion that the applicant’s complaints did not fall to be considered under 
Article 3 of the Convention due to the ‘trivial nature’ of the injuries which had been 
sustained.  The Court reiterated that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity 
in order to fall within the scope of Article 3.  However, ‘The assessment of this minimum 
is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context 
of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the 
sex, age and state of health of the victim.’4  The Court proceeded to state that,  
Treatment has been held…to be ‘inhuman’ because, inter alia, it was 
premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily 
injury or intense physical and mental suffering…Treatment has been considered 
‘degrading’ when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish 
and inferiority, capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking 
their physical or moral resistance.5 
 
Applying these standards to the facts of the case in question, the Court noted the 
physical violence suffered by the applicant, as a result of which she had sustained 
 5 
hypodermic bruising on the left hip and thigh, a scrape on the right cheek and brachium, 
bruising on the right eye and cheek, the left temple and the shin, a scrape on the left shin 
and hypodermic bruising on her face.  The Court also observed that the five incidents of 
violence had occurred over a one month time period.  In the Court’s view, the five 
instances therefore constituted a continuing situation, which it regarded as being an 
aggravating circumstance.  The Court also stated that it could not ‘turn a blind eye to the 
psychological aspect of the alleged ill-treatment.’6  The applicant had made credible 
assertions that she had been exposed to threats to her physical integrity over a certain 
period of time and that she had in fact been attacked on five occasions.  In this regard, the 
Court acknowledged that ‘psychological impact is an important aspect of the domestic 
violence.’7  The Court therefore considered that,  
the ill-treatment of the applicant, which on five occasions caused her physical 
injuries, combined with her feelings of fear and helplessness, was sufficiently 
serious to reach the level of severity under Article 3 of the Convention and thus 
raise the Government’s positive obligation under this provision.8  
The applicant’s complaints were thus declared to be admissible under Article 3 of the 
Convention.  In addition, the Court considered that, as the applicant’s complaint under 
Article 8 was based on the same facts, it must also be declared admissible. 
 
Having found that the level of severity of the ill-treatment suffered by the 
applicant reached the threshold for the applicability of Article 3, the Court then 
proceeded to analyse the adequacy of the response by the State.  The judgment asserted 
that,  
Once the Court has found that the level of severity of violence inflicted by private 
individuals attracts protection under Article 3 of the Convention, its case-law is 
consistent and clear to the effect that this Article requires the implementation of 
adequate criminal-law mechanisms.9    
The Court then reiterated its oft-cited principle that  
the obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention 
to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures 
designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-
treatment administered by private individuals.10 
Accordingly, ‘Article 3 requires States to put in place effective criminal-law provisions to 
deter the commission of offences against personal integrity, backed up by law-
enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of 
such provisions’.11  The Court went on to assert that, ‘In order that a State may be held 
responsible it must…be shown that the domestic legal system, and in particular the 
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criminal law applicable in the circumstances of the case, failed to provide practical and 
effective protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 3.’12 
 
In applying these principles to the facts of the case in question, the Court 
professed itself to be satisfied that the national law of Lithuania provided a sufficient 
regulatory framework to pursue the crimes alleged to have been committed by J.H.L. 
against the applicant.  However, it concluded that the national law had not been 
implemented in a manner sufficient to protect the rights of the applicant.  Once the case 
had been transferred for public prosecution, the investigation was then suspended twice 
for lack of evidence.  On each occasion, upon the persistent appeals of the applicant, the 
investigator’s decisions were quashed due to the investigations being insufficiently 
thorough.  The Court found this to be ‘a serious flaw on the part of the State.’13  
According to the Court, ‘the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 3 in 
the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves is in principle a matter that 
falls within the domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation, provided that criminal-law 
mechanisms are available to the victim.’14  In the Court’s view, it was not therefore 
appropriate for it to speculate on the question of whether the applicant’s criminal 
complaint should have been pursued by the public prosecutor or by way of a private 
prosecution.  Nevertheless, the fact remained that ‘the circumstances of the case were 
never established by a competent court of law.’15  The Court noted that one of the 
purposes of imposing criminal sanctions was to deter the offender from causing further 
harm, however this aim could not be achieved without having the facts of the case 
established by a criminal court.  The European Court thus stated that it could not  
accept that the purpose of effective protection against acts of ill-treatment is 
achieved where the criminal proceedings are discontinued owing to the fact that 
the prosecution has become time-barred and where this has occurred…as a result 
of the flaws in the actions of the relevant State authorities.16       
It was therefore concluded by the Court that, ‘the practices at issue in the present case, 
together with the manner in which the criminal-law mechanisms were implemented, did 
not provide adequate protection to the applicant against acts of violence’, and that there 
had thus been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.17  The Court stated that, having 
found a breach of Article 3, it was not necessary to examine the complaint separately 
under Article 8.  The applicant had claimed 20,000 euro in respect of non-pecuniary 
damage, however the Court viewed this amount as excessive and instead awarded the 
applicant 5,000 euro. 
 
Positive developments. 
 
The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Valiuliene v Lithuania is 
to be commended on a number of levels.  Firstly, the judgment adds to the Court’s 
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increasing corpus of jurisprudence on the issue of domestic violence and serves to 
reinforce the fact that it has now been established beyond doubt that domestic violence 
constitutes a human rights issue.  Although this principle may seem somewhat obvious, it 
should be remembered that it is only relatively recently that violence against women 
taking place in the home has been analysed in such a manner.  A contributory factor to 
the delay in recognising domestic violence as being a human rights issue was the 
public/private dichotomy which existed historically in international human rights law.  
The public/private dichotomy may be formulated in several ways.  Cook highlights two 
possibilities.18  Firstly, the public realm may be viewed as the area that is regulated by 
law and politics, and the private sphere as the area where regulation is seen as being 
inappropriate.  Secondly, the public arena can be viewed as the state and its agents, while 
the private sphere is constituted by nonstate activities.  In relation to the second 
interpretation of the public/private divide, international human rights law was originally 
designed in such a manner as to bind only states.  Therefore abuses such as domestic 
violence, which take place between private individuals, did not come within the original 
ambit of human rights law.  In addition, the rights norms that emerged were generally 
formulated in a very negative manner, whereby the state was required only to refrain 
from violating the rights in question.  There were no obligations on the state to take 
positive steps to ensure that the rights of the individual were not breached.  One 
implication of this was that the state was not required to protect the rights of the 
individual from violation by another private party, such as for example in a case of 
domestic violence.  Nevertheless, principles such as state responsibility and due diligence 
have now been developed within human rights law, and the public/private dichotomy is 
being gradually eroded.  Domestic violence is by no means the first issue breaking new 
ground in respect to involving the private sphere.  In particular, the European Court of 
Human Rights has developed a mature body of case law on a wide range of issues which 
transcends the public/private divide.   
 
In relation to violence against women in the home, although the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) does not make any explicit reference to domestic violence, it has nevertheless 
been interpreted in such a manner as to encompass this issue.  General Recommendation 
19 of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW Committee) was extremely important as it officially interpreted CEDAW as 
prohibiting violence against women in both the public and private contexts.  This 
Recommendation stated, 
that discrimination under the Convention is not restricted to action by or on behalf 
of Governments…Under general international law and specific human rights 
covenants, States may be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due 
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diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of 
violence, and for providing compensation.19 
The CEDAW Committee and other UN human rights bodies have now made numerous 
statements on the issue of domestic violence and have placed a broad range of obligations 
on states to take steps as regards this issue.  These duties include improving the responses 
of the criminal justice system; ensuring that civil law measures are effective; 
implementing public awareness campaigns; providing educational programmes for 
certain professionals such as those working in health care; and, crucially, providing social 
support measures such as housing, refuge accommodation and child care facilities to 
victims.  The European Court of Human Rights has also played a key role in the gradual 
erosion of the public/private dichotomy in human rights law through its creation of the 
doctrine of positive obligations.  However, even after the development of such principles, 
it was not until 2007 that the issue of domestic violence was considered substantively by 
the European Court.  Therefore every addition to the Court’s jurisprudence on this issue 
is welcome in itself. 
 
The fact that the Court in Valiuliene was not content simply to accept the unilateral 
declaration of the State that there had been a violation of Article 8, but no violation of 
Article 3 due to what the State termed ‘the trivial nature’ of the applicant’s injuries20 is 
also praiseworthy.  This serves to emphasise that the Court views violence against 
women in the home as a serious matter and not one to be approached with the lack of 
gravity with which the State appeared to deal with the matter in the case in question.     
 
Difficulties with the Court’s approach.     
 
However, there are also difficulties with the Court’s approach in this case, some 
of which are highlighted in the Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, who 
stated that although he voted for the operative part of the judgment, he could not 
subscribe to its motivation.  Essentially he felt that the case ‘raised fundamental legal 
issues which have not been dealt with properly by the majority’,21 and that further 
explanation was needed regarding the application of the European Convention to cases 
involving domestic violence.  In his Concurring Opinion, the Judge stated that, 
the full effet utile of the European Convention on Human Rights…can only be 
achieved with a gender-sensitive interpretation and application of its provisions 
which takes in account the factual inequalities between women and men and the 
way they impact on women’s lives.  In that light, it is self-evident that the very act 
of domestic violence has an inherent humiliating and debasing character for the 
victim, which is exactly what the offender aims at.  Physical pain is but one of the 
intended effects.  A kick, a slap or a spit is also aimed at belittling the dignity of 
the partner, conveying a message of humiliation and degradation.  It is precisely 
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this intrinsic element of humiliation that attracts the applicability of Article 3 of 
the Convention.  The imputation of an Article 8 violation would fall short of the 
real and full meaning of violence in the domestic context, and would thus fail to 
qualify as a ‘gendered understanding of violence’.22  
 
The Judge then proceeded to discuss how the ‘Osman test’ should be applied in 
cases of domestic violence.  This test was put forward by the European Court in Osman v 
United Kingdom23 to determine when States have positive obligations to intervene to 
protect individuals from the acts of other private parties.  Essentially the State has a duty 
to protect when the authorities knew, or ought to have known at the time, of the existence 
of a real and immediate risk to an identified individual or individuals from the criminal 
acts of a third party.  In such circumstances the State authorities are under an obligation 
to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have 
been expected to avoid that risk.  However, the Osman test in its usual form is 
insufficient in cases involving domestic violence, as when there is an ‘immediate risk’ in 
such circumstances it is frequently too late for the State to intervene.  As Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque commented, ‘the recurrence and escalation inherent in most cases of 
domestic violence makes it somewhat artificial, even deleterious to require an immediacy 
of the risk.  Even though the risk might not be imminent, it is already a serious risk when 
it is present.’24   
 
The Judge proceeded to suggest that a more rigorous standard of diligence than 
the traditional Osman test is especially necessary in the context of certain societies, such 
as that of Lithuania, which are faced with particularly long-lasting and widespread 
problems as regards domestic violence.  A nation-wide study found that 42 percent of 
women in Lithuania who were aged between 18 and 74 and who had husbands or 
partners had been physically assaulted or threatened with physical assault by their current 
partners.25  Lithuania became a party to CEDAW in January 1994.  In July 2008 the 
CEDAW Committee issued its Concluding Observations on the latest report submitted by 
the State.  In its Concluding Observations the Committee commented that it remained 
concerned at the high prevalence of violence against women in Lithuania, and in 
particular at the high levels of domestic violence.  The Committee also expressed its 
concerns that this situation may lead to such violence being considered to be a private 
matter, whereby the issues involved may not be fully understood by the police, other 
relevant authorities and indeed Lithuanian society as a whole.  The Committee therefore 
urged the State to ensure that comprehensive legal and other measures were in place to 
address all forms of violence against women, including domestic violence.26  Judge Pinto 
de Albuquerque was thus of the view that the due diligence standard to be applied in 
cases involving domestic violence should be framed as,  
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If a State knows or ought to know that a segment of its population, such as 
women, is subject to repeated violence and fails to prevent harm from befalling 
the members of that group of people when they face a present (but not yet 
imminent) risk, the State can be found responsible by omission for the resulting 
human rights violations.27 
 
In addition, the majority judgment of the European Court in Valiuliene v 
Lithuania stated that it was not appropriate for the Court to speculate on the question of 
whether the applicant’s criminal complaint should have been pursued by the public 
prosecutor or by way of a private prosecution.  However, as Judge Pinto de Albuquerque 
pointed out,  
in most cases, to place the victim of domestic violence in the unbearable quandary 
of having to decide for herself whether she wants to harm the family/intimate 
relationship through private prosecution is to perpetuate the subordinate position 
of the victim, and therefore, the violence itself, because she is evidently not in a 
position of freedom to make that choice due to her state of dependency on the 
offender.28 
The Judge then expressed the view that to require a victim of domestic violence to act as 
a private prosecutor is simply not compatible with the State’s obligation to protect.  It is 
submitted that the Judge is correct in his reasoning.  It is widely recognised that for a 
victim of domestic violence, the decision even to make a statement to the police 
regarding the abuse she has suffered is frequently extremely difficult.  There are a 
multitude of reasons why she may not wish to have the perpetrator prosecuted, such as a 
desire to keep the family together for the sake of children or the fact that she may be 
financially dependent on her abuser.  Indeed, there has been a great deal of debate on the 
question of whether there are circumstances in which prosecutions should proceed even 
against the wishes of the victim.  For example, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in 
England and Wales adopts the approach that in some cases the abuse is so severe that the 
perpetrator must be prosecuted even without the victim’s consent.  In 2009 the CPS 
issued a policy document in which it states that, ‘The views and interests of the victim are 
important, but they cannot be the final word on the subject of a CPS prosecution.  Any 
future risks to the victim, their children or any other potential victim have to be taken into 
consideration.’29  In any event, it is without doubt that victims of domestic violence 
should be given the highest possible levels of support throughout the prosecution process.  
It is submitted that the European Court should have made it clear in its judgment that 
requiring a victim of domestic violence to act as a private prosecutor is never compatible 
with the State’s positive obligations under the Convention.   
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The Court’s previous case law on domestic violence.     
 
In a footnote to his Concurring Opinion, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque further 
stated that,  
The majority missed the opportunity to set out a principled reasoning to impute a 
violation of Article 3, and not of Article 8, to the respondent State, preferring 
once again to remain attached to the particular specificities of the case.  Yet that 
reasoning was much needed in view of the current disparate case-law…Moreover, 
having rejected the respondent Government’s unilateral declaration, which 
acknowledged a violation of Article 8, the Court had an additional duty to provide 
a thorough reasoning of its finding of a violation of Article 3.30   
Essentially one of the main problems with the judgment of the European Court in 
Valiuliene v Lithuania is that the Court missed a key opportunity to clarify the rationale 
behind its use of Articles 3 and 8 in its jurisprudence on the issue of domestic violence.  
In cases involving violence against women in the home which come before the European 
Court, applicants usually seek to make arguments based upon Articles 3 and 8 and also, 
in some instances, Articles 2, 13 and 14 of the Convention.  However, the approach of the 
Court as regards the Articles on which it bases its findings of violations of the 
Convention tends to be somewhat inconsistent and incoherent, particularly in relation to 
the use of Articles 3 and 8.  In certain cases involving domestic violence, such as Opuz v 
Turkey31 and E.S. and Others v Slovakia,32 the Court has found breaches of Article 3.  
Nevertheless, there have equally been other cases, such as Bevacqua and S v Bulgaria,33  
A v Croatia34 and Kalucza v Hungary,35 in which the Court has found violations of 
Article 8 only and refrained from examining the cases under Article 3 also.  In Valiuliene 
v Lithuania however, the Court did exactly the opposite and stated that it was not 
necessary to examine the complaint under Article 8, as it had already found a violation of 
Article 3.  The difficulty is that the Court’s reasoning for this difference in approach is 
not explained in its judgment. 
On the facts of Valiuliene v Lithuania, there appears to be nothing to distinguish 
the violence suffered by the applicant from that which was experienced by the applicants 
in other cases involving domestic violence in which arguments were made in respect of 
inter alia Articles 3 and 8 and in which the Court based its findings on breaches of 
Article 8 only.  For example, one of the seminal cases in the area of domestic violence is 
that of Bevacqua and S v Bulgaria.36  The application in this case was submitted by the 
first applicant on her own behalf and also on behalf of her son S.  The first applicant had 
married Mr N. in 1995 and given birth to S. in January 1997.  However Mr N. became 
aggressive and on 1 March 2000 the first applicant left the family home with her son and 
moved into her parents’ apartment.  Nevertheless more instances of violence followed, 
and the injuries sustained by the first applicant included bruising of her eyelid, face, arm 
and hip and swelling of her cheek.  It was alleged that the authorities had failed to protect 
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the first applicant against the violent behaviour of her former husband and had failed to 
take the necessary measures to secure respect for the family life of both applicants.  It 
was therefore argued that the State had violated Articles 3, 8, 13 and 14 of the European 
Convention.  It was also alleged that there had been a breach of Article 6, due to the 
excessive length of the custody proceedings surrounding the first applicant’s son.   
The Court examined the complaints under Article 8, but not under Articles 3, 13 
or 14.  In holding that there had been a violation of Article 8, the Court stated that,  
At the relevant time Bulgarian law did not provide for specific administrative and 
policing measures (in relation to domestic violence) and the measures taken by 
the police and prosecuting authorities on the basis of their general powers did not 
prove effective...In the Court’s view, the authorities’ failure to impose sanctions 
or otherwise enforce Mr N.’s obligation to refrain from unlawful acts was critical 
in the circumstances of this case, as it amounted to a refusal to provide the 
immediate assistance the applicants needed.   The authorities’ view that no such 
assistance was due as the dispute concerned a ‘private matter’ was incompatible 
with their positive obligations to secure the enjoyment of the applicants’ Article 8 
rights.37 
The Court held that there had been no violation of Article 6 as the length of the custody 
proceedings had not been unreasonable.  As regards the breach of Article 8, 4,000 euro 
was awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage and 3,000 euro in respect of costs and 
expenses.  In this case, the severity of the applicant’s injuries seems to be fairly similar to 
that of the injuries of the applicant in Valiuliene v Lithuania, and the attacks were carried 
out over a longer period of time than in the Valiuliene case.   
 
Likewise, in A v Croatia38 the Court held that having found a violation of Article 
8, there was no need to consider the case under Articles 2, 3 or 13, in respect of which the 
applicant had also alleged violations.  In this case the applicant complained that the 
authorities had failed to protect her against the domestic violence of her ex-husband 
despite having been aware of his repeated physical and verbal assaults and death threats.  
The applicant’s ex-husband suffered from severe mental disorders and, between 
November 2003 and June 2006, he had subjected the applicant to repeated violent 
behaviour.  The violence was both physical, including kicking and hitting the applicant in 
the head, face and body, and also verbal, including making serious death threats against 
the applicant.  Various proceedings were brought against the applicant’s ex-husband in 
the national courts, and measures such as restraining orders, psychiatric or psycho-social 
treatment, and a prison term were ordered.  However, only some of these orders were 
actually implemented.  The applicant alleged that the authorities had failed to protect her 
adequately from domestic violence and argued that the State was thereby in violation of 
Articles 2, 3, 8, 13 and 14 of the European Convention.   
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The Court held that the authorities’ failure to implement the measures ordered by 
the national courts, aimed both at addressing the psychiatric condition of the applicant’s 
ex-husband and also at providing the applicant with protection against further violence, 
had left her for a prolonged period in a situation in which her right to respect for her 
private life under Article 8 of the Convention had been violated.  However, having found 
a breach of Article 8, the Court stated that it was not necessary to examine the complaint 
under Articles 2, 3 or 13 also.  The Court did however declare that the applicant’s 
complaint of a violation of Article 14 was inadmissible, as she had not given sufficient 
evidence, such as reports or statistics, to establish that the measures and practices adopted 
by the State against domestic violence, or the effects of such measures or practices, were 
discriminatory.  The applicant was awarded 9,000 euro in respect of non-pecuniary 
damage and 4,470 euro in respect of costs and expenses.  Again, the violent attacks 
against the applicant in this case were carried out over a much longer period of time than 
were the attacks against the applicant in Valiuliene.  Also, it seems that the injuries in 
question in A v Croatia were of a more severe nature.  Why then was a violation of solely 
Article 8 found in A v Croatia, while the Court was so adamant that it was necessary to 
find a breach of Article 3 in Valiuliene?        
 
The Court adopted the same approach as in A v Croatia in Kalucza v Hungary,39 
another case involving domestic violence in which the applicant argued that the State was 
in violation of Articles 2, 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention.  Again the Court found a breach 
of Article 8 and then proceeded to state that as a consequence it was unnecessary to 
examine the case under Articles 2, 3 or 13.  At the time of the Court’s judgment in this 
case, the applicant was unwillingly sharing a flat with her violent ex-partner, Gy.B., 
pending the outcome of numerous civil disputes concerning the ownership of the flat.  
Following her divorce, the applicant had begun a relationship with Gy.B. in April 2005.  
At that time, she shared joint ownership of the flat with her ex-husband, however at the 
start of the relationship between the applicant and Gy.B., the latter decided to pay the ex-
husband’s share in the flat.  Gy.B. officially acquired ownership of this share in January 
2006 and the flat was registered as his place of residence in November 2006.  The 
relationship between the applicant and Gy.B. ended around January 2007.  Since then 
Gy.B. continued to stay in the flat against the applicant’s wishes.  The applicant 
requested the help of the relevant authorities on numerous occasions, and lodged criminal 
complaints against Gy.B. of rape, assault and harassment.  On two occasions Gy.B. was 
found guilty of assault, released on parole and ordered to pay a fine.  On three occasions 
the applicant herself was found guilty of disorderly conduct, assault and causing grievous 
bodily harm.  The applicant made two requests for a restraining order to be brought 
against Gy.B.  Her first request, which was made in June 2008, was dismissed by the 
courts in January 2010 on the ground that both parties were responsible for their bad 
relationship.  Her second request was also dismissed for the same reason.  Between 
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October 2005 and August 2010, 13 medical reports were drawn up which recorded 
contusions mostly to the applicant’s head, face, chest and neck.  The applicant argued 
that the State was in violation of Articles 2, 3, 8 and 13 of the European Convention, due 
to the failure of the authorities to protect her from constant physical and psychological 
abuse in her home.    
 
In its judgment the European Court noted that it had taken the Hungarian 
authorities more than one and a half years to decide on the applicant’s first request for a 
restraining order, despite the fact that the fundamental reason behind such a measure was 
to provide prompt protection to victims of violence.  In addition, insufficient reasons had 
been given for the dismissal of the requests, the courts merely relying on the fact that 
both parties had been involved in assaults against the other.  As the Court pointed out, if 
such an order could not be made in the event of a mutual assault, the possibility of the 
victim having acted in legitimate self-defence would be ruled out and the aim of 
providing effective protection to victims would be seriously undermined.  The national 
courts had also failed to comply with their obligation to decide on the civil cases 
concerning the flat within a reasonable time.  Even though the applicant had lodged 
criminal complaints against her partner for assault, had repeatedly requested that 
restraining orders be brought against him and had brought civil proceedings to order his 
eviction from the flat, the authorities had failed to adopt sufficient measures to secure the 
effective protection of the applicant.  There had thus been a violation of Article 8 of the 
Convention.  Having thereby found a breach of Article 8, the Court stated that it was thus 
unnecessary to examine the applicant’s complaint under Articles 2, 3 or 13 also.  The 
Court proceeded to award the applicant the sum of 5,150 euro in respect of non-pecuniary 
damage with regards to the violation of Article 8.  Again the violence in question in this 
case was carried out over a much longer period of time than the abuse against the 
applicant in Valiuliene and the injuries suffered by the applicant in Kalucza appear, if 
anything, to be more severe than those sustained by the applicant in Valiuliene.        
  
The question arises therefore of why did the Court adopt such an approach in 
Bevacqua and S v Bulgaria, A v Croatia and Kalucza v Hungary?  There are at least two 
possible reasons for the Court’s approach of finding violations of Article 8 and then 
omitting to consider Article 3, among other provisions of the Convention, in the cases 
discussed above.  The first, and perhaps the less charitable explanation, is that in the past 
the Court may not have fully appreciated the seriousness of domestic violence, and 
therefore felt that it was more appropriate to deal with such cases as involving violations 
of the right to respect for private and family life, as opposed to the non-derogable right to 
be free from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  However, it 
must be remembered that in certain cases prior to Valiuliene v Lithuania, such as Opuz v 
Turkey40 and E.S. and Others v Slovakia,41 the Court did find violations of Article 3 in 
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cases involving domestic violence.  It seems therefore that this explanation is less than 
satisfactory.      
 
The second possible reason, and perhaps the more likely explanation of the 
Court’s previous approach, relates purely to the issue of practicality.  It is a well-known 
fact that the European Court is currently burdened with a case load which stretches its 
resources to breaking point and beyond.  That being the situation, for reasons of 
expediency, the Court frequently takes the approach of finding a violation of one Article 
of the Convention and then omitting to consider the application of other Articles on 
which arguments have been made by applicants.  This approach is adopted by the Court 
in many types of cases, and is by no means limited to cases involving domestic violence.  
The fact that in cases involving violence against women in the home, the Court has 
frequently seemed to display a preference for the use of Article 8 over that of Article 3 
may simply be due to the fact that it can be somewhat easier to establish a breach of 
Article 8 than it is to establish a violation of Article 3.  If this is the reason behind the 
Court’s approach, it is difficult to be unsympathetic to the Court, given the enormous 
pressure under which it works in terms of its huge caseload.  Nevertheless, it could be 
argued that by addressing all the articles relied upon by an applicant, the Court could 
produce clearer overall guidance which may in turn enable states to apply the Convention 
more consistently at the domestic level, thereby reducing the number of applications 
being lodged at Strasbourg.  Also, if the reason for the Court’s current approach is purely 
that of expediency, the difficulty is that such an approach may be interpreted as being 
based on principle, with that principle being that domestic violence is only serious 
enough to fall within Article 8, but does not in the majority of cases meet the threshold of 
constituting a violation of Article 3.  This is problematic, to say the least.  Indeed there is 
evidence in the case of Valiuliene v Lithuania itself that the practice of the Court was 
being interpreted in this manner.  In his Dissenting Opinion in the case, Judge Jociene 
stated that he was of the opinion that ‘the Court has incorrectly relied on Article 3 in the 
circumstances of the present case’ and that ‘This position of the Chamber is not 
supported by the Court’s case-law, where domestic violence cases are mostly examined 
from the perspective of Article 8 of the Convention.’42  Judge Jociene went on to say that, 
‘Accordingly, and referring to the Court’s case-law on the subject…the applicant’s 
complaint in connection with the physical attacks on her should have been examined 
under Article 8 of the Convention and the applicant’s right to respect for her private 
life.’43  It is clear therefore that Judge Jociene was of the view that the general practice of 
the Court was to use Article 8 in cases of domestic violence, as opposed to Article 3, and 
that this approach was grounded on principle as opposed to being based purely on 
practical considerations.  Equally, in accepting that there had been a breach of Article 8 
in the case but not a violation of Article 3, it is not inconceivable that the State may have 
consulted the Court’s previous case law on domestic violence and concluded that it was 
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probable that a violation of Article 8 would be found, and that the case would not be 
analysed under Article 3.  The fact that the State seemed to be of the view that abuse 
constituting a violation of Article 8 could still be described as resulting in injuries that are 
‘merely trivial’ in nature is troubling, and raises concerns over the message which the 
Court’s use of Article 8 in cases of domestic violence has sent out to States.       
 
Why did the Court adopt a different approach in Valiuliene v Lithuania? 
 
Whatever the reason for the Court’s approach in its previous case law involving 
domestic violence, the question arises of why a different approach was adopted in 
Valiuliene v Lithuania.  In this instance, the Court again limited its consideration to one 
Article of the Convention, however this time it chose Article 3 as opposed to Article 8 as 
the provision to be applied.  However, why was the Court so adamant that a violation of 
Article 3 had been established in this particular instance?  As discussed above, on the 
facts of the case, there appears to be nothing to distinguish the violence suffered by the 
applicant from that experienced by the applicants in other cases involving domestic 
violence in which the Court had based its judgments on Article 8, in terms of the intensity 
of the abuse or the severity of the injuries sustained.  Indeed the Court itself does not 
seem to have viewed the violence sustained by the applicant in Valiuliene as more severe 
than that suffered by the applicants in the cases involving violence against women in the 
home discussed above, as seen in the levels of compensation for non-pecuniary damage 
awarded by the Court in these cases.  In Valiuliene the Court awarded the applicant 5,000 
euro for non-pecuniary damage in respect of the breach of Article 3.  In Bevacqua, A v 
Croatia and Kalucza the applicants were awarded 4,000 euro, 9,000 euro and 5,150 euro 
respectively for non-pecuniary damage as regards the violations of Article 8.  The level 
of non-pecuniary damage awarded in Valiuliene is therefore lower than that which was 
awarded in Kalucza and significantly lower than that which was awarded in A v Croatia.  
      
It seems that the most likely explanation of the change in approach on the part of 
the Court as regards Valiuliene v Lithuania lies with the actions of the State in question in 
submitting the unilateral declaration accepting that there had been a violation of Article 8, 
but stating that there had been no breach of Article 3.  It must be remembered that in the 
cases involving domestic violence in which the Court found a violation of Article 8 and 
then omitted to examine Article 3, it was by no means saying that a breach of Article 3 
could not be substantiated.  It was merely stating that having found a violation of the 
Convention in respect of one Article, it was unnecessary to examine the case under any 
other provisions of the Convention.  If however the Court had simply accepted the State’s 
unilateral declaration of a breach of Article 8 in Valiuliene v Lithuania without further 
examination it would, implicitly at least, be accepting that there had been no violation of 
Article 3 in this instance.  It seems that such an outcome was not desired by the Court.  
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Indeed not only did the Court refuse to accept the State’s unilateral declaration, but it also 
proceeded to make findings in its judgment that were in a sense the exact opposite of 
what the State had asserted in its unilateral declaration.  Instead of agreeing that there was 
a violation of Article 8, but not of Article 3, the Court held that there was a breach of 
Article 3 and that it was not therefore necessary to examine whether there had been a 
violation of Article 8 also.   
 
It appears likely that the Court’s approach in Valiuliene v Lithuania was 
influenced to a large extent by the attitude which the State seemed to exhibit in making 
its unilateral declaration.  In making the declaration the State claimed that although it 
accepted that there had been a violation of Article 8, there had been no violation of 
Article 3 due to what it termed ‘the trivial nature’ of the applicant’s injuries44.  It 
appeared that the State was therefore minimising the seriousness of what was, even on its 
own admission, a human rights violation.  As the Court itself pointed out, in assessing the 
minimum level of severity of abuse needed to fall within the scope of Article 3, all the 
circumstances of the case must be taken into consideration, including ‘the nature and 
context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some 
instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.’45  In claiming that there had been 
no violation of Article 3, the State had failed to take into account the particular 
circumstances which surround situations involving domestic violence, in particular the 
psychological impact which such abuse has on the victim.  The Court may well have 
wished to distance itself from the views of the State in this regard, and the most effective 
way of doing so was arguably to find a violation of Article 3 only and hold that it was 
therefore unnecessary to examine the applicability of Article 8. 
 
It is interesting to speculate on the question of what approach the Court would 
have adopted in this case had the State not submitted its unilateral declaration.  It is of 
course impossible to know how the Court would have responded in the absence of such a 
declaration, and so this question can only ever be a matter of conjecture.  Nevertheless, 
given the Court’s history in dealing with cases involving domestic violence, it is not 
inconceivable that the Court would have adopted a similar approach to its judgments in 
Bevacqua and S v Bulgaria,46  A v Croatia47 and Kalucza v Hungary,48 in which the 
Court found violations of Article 8 and then stated that it was not necessary to examine 
the cases under Article 3 also.  If the Court had adopted such an approach in Valiuliene v 
Lithuania, it is unlikely that it would have done so with the intention of implying that the 
abuse in question was insufficient to amount to a violation of Article 3, or that the 
situation was less serious than a finding of a breach of Article 3 would have inferred.  
Nevertheless, in making its unilateral declaration the State seemed to be of the view that 
being found in violation of Article 8 would be a less serious matter than being found to 
be in breach of Article 3.  The State may therefore have ‘shot itself in the foot’, so to 
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speak, by making its unilateral declaration in this case.  In doing so, it is possible that the 
State actually spurred the Court into finding a violation of Article 3 in order to emphasise 
the seriousness of violence against women in the home.   
 
As discussed above and as pointed out by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in his 
Concurring Opinion, one of the difficulties with the Court’s judgment in Valiuliene v 
Lithuania is that the Court failed to set out a principled rationale for its use of the various 
Convention provisions, particularly Articles 3 and 8, as bases for finding violations in 
cases involving domestic violence.  However, it is likely that one of the main reasons for 
the Court’s omission in this respect is that in reality it is impossible to rationalise the 
somewhat haphazard case law in any kind of reasoned manner.  As discussed above, 
there seems to be no explanation in principle as to why Article 8 violations were found in 
Bevacqua and S v Bulgaria,49  A v Croatia50 and Kalucza v Hungary,51 while the finding 
of a breach of Article 8 was insufficient in Valiuliene v Lithuania, as demonstrated by the 
Court’s refusal to accept the State’s unilateral declaration in this regard.  Indeed it seems 
likely that the reasoning behind the findings of violations of Article 8 only was purely a 
matter of expediency.  In the absence of a principled rationale for its approach, there is in 
reality no explanation that can be given by the Court.  Nevertheless, this should not 
detract from the merits of the Court’s resolute attitude in Valiuliene v Lithuania.  It is 
much to the Court’s credit that it did not accept the State’s unilateral declaration and 
instead chose to examine the case under Article 3 only, even though such a course of 
action constituted a departure from its previous jurisprudence.     
                  
It is interesting to note that in adopting such a resolute approach to the issue of 
domestic violence in this case, the Court may have been partly influenced by the adoption 
by the Council of Europe of the Convention on Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence.  Indeed this Convention is mentioned by the Court in its judgment.52  The 
Convention has currently been signed by 32 States of the Council of Europe, with eight 
ratifications.  Although it has not yet entered into force as ten ratifications are necessary 
before it can do so, the Convention nevertheless contains very detailed provisions on the 
responses which States should adopt as regards the issue of domestic violence.  It is 
possible that the adoption of this Convention by the Council of Europe may well have 
influenced the approach taken by the European Court in the present case, for example, it 
was noted by the Court that Lithuania was not yet a signatory to the Convention.53 
 
One final observation regarding the Court’s approach in Valiuliene v Lithuania 
relates to the amount of damages awarded in the case.  The applicant had claimed 20,000 
euro in respect of non-pecuniary damage, however the Court viewed this amount as 
excessive and instead awarded the applicant 5,000 euro.  Judge Jociene, who wrote a 
Dissenting Opinion, was of the view that as the case had been examined under Article 3, 
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the amount of compensation awarded to the applicant should have been increased in 
order to reflect a finding of a violation of Article 3.  This is a very interesting statement 
indeed, given the fact that Judge Jociene was of the opinion that the case should have 
been examined exclusively under Article 8 and that the State’s unilateral declaration 
should have been accepted.  Also, as Judge Jociene is the Lithuanian judge, he was 
essentially making the point that an increased level of damages should have been 
awarded against his own State, given that a violation of Article 3 had been found.  
Although the level of compensation awarded in Valiuliene v Lithuania is broadly in line 
with amounts awarded by the Court in other cases involving domestic violence, it could 
be argued that larger amounts of compensation should be awarded by the Court in cases 
involving violence against women in the home in view of the very serious impact which 
such abuse frequently has on the victim.  
   
Conclusion. 
 
In conclusion, it could perhaps be argued that to an individual applicant the 
crucial issue of concern is whether the European Court of Human Rights finds a violation 
of the Convention in his or her case, and the question of whether the violation is of 
Article 3 or of Article 8 is of no great significance.  This argument is indeed valid to a 
certain extent.  If the Court finds a violation of any Article of the Convention and awards 
compensation to the applicant, it is likely that the applicant will feel vindicated, at least to 
some degree.  In a footnote to his Concurring Opinion, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque 
commented that the issue of on which Articles the Court bases its findings is ‘obviously 
not irrelevant, for compensation and other purposes.’54  However, as discussed above, it 
seems that, at least in domestic violence cases, the question of on which Article the Court 
grounds its finding of a violation makes no difference to the amount of compensation 
awarded to the individual applicant.  Nevertheless, the significance of this issue stretches 
beyond the issue of compensation.  It is arguable that a finding on the part of the 
European Court of Human Rights that domestic violence constitutes a violation of the 
non-derogable right to be free from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment sends out a stronger message to States regarding the seriousness with which 
the Court regards this issue than does a finding that domestic violence breaches the right 
to respect for private and family life.  Indeed, in rejecting the State’s unilateral 
declaration of a violation of Article 8 in Valiuliene, the Court seemed to realise this to be 
the case.       
 
The decision of the European Court in Valiuliene v Lithuania certainly represents 
an extremely interesting addition to the Court’s jurisprudence on the subject of domestic 
violence.  However, even more interesting is the question of how the Court will further 
develop its case law in this area in the wake of the case.  Will the Court continue to use 
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Article 3 as the primary basis for its decisions, or will it revert to the frequent use of 
Article 8 which seemed to characterise its previous case law on this subject?  Some 
indication of the answer to this question may be found in the case of Eremia and Others v 
the Republic of Moldova,55 in respect of which the European Court issued its judgment 
on 28 May 2013.   This case concerned a complaint by Ms Eremia and her two daughters 
that their Articles 3 and 14 rights had been violated due to the failure of the Moldovan 
authorities to protect them from the violent and abusive behaviour of their husband and 
father, who was a police officer.  The Court held that, despite their knowledge of the 
abuse, the authorities had failed to take effective measures against Ms Eremia’s husband, 
and had failed to protect Ms Eremia from further domestic violence.  There had thus been 
a violation of Article 3 in respect of Ms Eremia.  In addition, the Court found that the 
authorities’ attitude had amounted to condoning violence and had been discriminatory 
towards Ms Eremia as a woman.  There had therefore been a violation of Article 14 read 
in conjunction with Article 3.  The alleged violations of the rights of the two daughters 
related not to physical violence inflicted upon them, but to verbal abuse and to the 
detrimental psychological effects of witnessing their father’s violence against their 
mother in the family home.  Although they had alleged a breach of Article 3, the Court 
held that Article 8 was the more appropriate provision under which to examine their 
complaints, and proceeded to find a violation of this provision.  The Court in this case 
made no reference to its decision in Valiuliene v Lithuania, however it is nonetheless 
notable that the Court found a violation of Article 3.  Although the Court decided that the 
complaints of Ms Eremia’s daughters should be considered under Article 8 as opposed to 
Article 3, there was no question of such an approach being adopted as regards the 
violence suffered by Ms Eremia herself.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
arguments made were based only on Articles 3 and 14 (and not Article 8) in respect of 
this violence.   
 
Arguably, it seems that in domestic violence cases in which both Articles 3 and 8 
are relied upon, in the light of Valiuliene it will be necessary for the Court to examine 
such cases under Article 3 instead of simply finding a violation of Article 8 and then 
stating that it is unnecessary to examine the case under Article 3 also.  It appears that to 
do otherwise would leave the Court open to allegations of inconsistency, given its 
approach to the State’s admission of a breach of Article 8 in Valiuliene.  Indeed, due to 
the widespread and deplorable nature of domestic violence, it would surely be reasonable 
for the Court to indicate clearly that all future applications connected to this issue will be 
considered under Article 3 first and foremost and only then under other articles.  If this 
approach were adopted by the Court, the next development in the domestic violence 
context may be the question of whether domestic violence should be regarded as inhuman 
or degrading treatment, or as torture.  In none of the cases involving domestic violence in 
which breaches of Article 3 have been found has the Court stated that the treatment in 
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question amounts to torture.  However, a number of commentators have likened domestic 
violence to torture.56  In certain cases, such as Ireland v United Kingdom,57 a State has 
tried (unsuccessfully) to admit to inhuman and degrading treatment in the hope that the 
Court will not then consider whether the ill-treatment in question actually amounted to 
torture. It is possible that a State may attempt to make such an argument in a case 
involving domestic violence, and that a definitive ruling on this issue may constitute the 
next development in the European Court’s jurisprudence in this area.   
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